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Cluster-Building and  
the Transformation of the University1 
Frank Meier und Uwe Schimank 
One of the noticeable recent changes of universities in many Western coun-
tries consists in efforts to establish research clusters, »critical masses«, cen-
ters etc. Let us, for the moment use the term »cluster« in a broad sense and 
refer to larger-scale arrangements of coordinated research – as opposed to 
individual research. Of course there are disciplinary fields with a strong 
tradition of hierarchically integrated research. However, what we can ob-
serve recently across disciplinary boundaries is an increasing attention for 
clusters, an increasing relevance in discourse and in intra-organizational 
decision-making. At the same time a considerable and increasing share of 
public funding is spent on clusters.2  
As an observer of the German university scene states: »Suddenly every-
thing seems to rhyme with priority areas, centers, clusters, alliances, networks. 
Small research arrangements are eyed with suspicion, and are perceived as out-
dated and not very efficient.« (Mittelstraß 2011: 14; our translation). 
Much of the appeal of clusters is based on the widespread belief in their 
functional superiority. On the one hand clusters are identified with coope-
ration and cooperation is generally considered to be a good thing (Katz, 
Martin 1997). On the other hand a »belief in size« (Fischer 2012: 28) has 
become part of the idea of how »good« research should look like (Schiene, 
Schimank 2007). According to a critical mass argument scientific work re-
quires a certain minimum size of a research entity in order to allow for high 
                                                        
 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 27th EGOS Colloquium in Gothen-
burg, Sweden. 
 2 In 2009 the DFG spent 54.9 % of its funding on coordinated programs (DFG 2009: 177). 
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quality research. Clusters are also perceived as being the appropriate organi-
zational form for more complex research problems. Proponents of cluster-
building see in this respect an irresistible inner-scientific dynamic towards 
larger-scaled research problems as well as an equally irresistible extra-scien-
tific dynamic towards »bigger questions« of societal relevance such as climate 
change or the performance of national school systems.  
In this paper we cannot discuss in detail whether these functional argu-
ments are empirically accurate. Here it is only important to state that func-
tional arguments are in the air. They are available to scientists, university 
leadership, and politicians to legitimize cluster-building efforts. Nevertheless 
we will see that also critical accounts find a powerful voice in discourse. 
What we want to explore is the tight connection between cluster-building, 
on the one hand, and two other recent transformations of the university 
system: the emerging actorhood of universities which manifests itself mainly 
in the strengthening of university leadership, and the expectation directed at 
university leadership that it should promote profile-building of its university. 
It is this triangle of transformations we want to explore. We start with a des-
criptive exposition of what is meant by clusters. Then we ask with respect to 
researchers, on the one hand, and university leadership, on the other, why the 
latter and some of the former have got interested in cluster-building whereas 
others of the former oppose. After that we take a look at the interplay of top-
down and bottom-up activities involved in cluster-building. Here we distin-
guish the creation of a new cluster from the handling of an existing one. In 
this way we follow the life-cycle of a cluster from its beginning to its end. 
This is a theoretical exploration of the subject which aims at conceptual 
clarifications, useful typologies, and general hypotheses which guide further 
research. Empirical evidence from various sources is used for illustrative pur-
poses only. Most of our examples refer to Germany but we also use examples 
from other countries. 
Clusters:  
Contacts – Communication – Coordination – Cooperation 
The empirical variety of what can be called »research clusters« is confusing, 
even if the institutional specificities of just one country such as Germany are 
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taken into account.3 The term cluster as we understand it may refer to two 
levels of analysis we have to distinguish carefully. On the one hand clusters 
are social structures of actual scientific contact, coordination, and coopera-
tion. We refer to this as the substantial level. On the other hand clusters are 
formal structures that are deliberately designed to establish or to foster these 
structures of contact, coordination, and cooperation. We refer to this as the 
formal level. 
The substantial level 
In a typology of elementary forms of governance, clusters can be categorized 
on the substantial level as networks or communities (Schimank 2007). In an 
abstract view clusters as social configurations grow from opportunities for 
contacts which lead to an intensification of communication. If this in turns 
brings about a deliberate collective effort of coordination a cluster comes into 
being; and to some extent that coordination may even become cooperation. 
Thus, on the substantial level cluster-building starts from contact oppor-
tunities which exist or come into existence among certain researchers. If 
these opportunities turn up frequently enough they can be used for a regular 
communication. A one-shot contact – for instance at a discussion after a 
lecture – can sometimes re-direct a researcher’s work in a radical way; still, 
to be the starting point of the emergence of a cluster more frequent contacts 
are required.4 Wherever the density of communicative exchange exceeds a 
certain level ongoing mutual inspiration may arise. Mutual inspiration cer-
tainly has the important side-effect of a tacit collective coordination of re-
search activities both as a negative and as a positive coordination.5 The former 
means no more than the avoidance of conflicts, mainly by staking and respec-
ting eachother’s claims whereas positive coordination aims at the pursuit of 
a common research agenda in a certain division of labour. To be a cluster a 
regular communicative configuration of researchers has to have the explicitly 
negotiated and articulated positive coordination of the research activities of 
each cluster member as one of its principal purposes. This means a cluster 
has not just a de facto but an agreed-upon division of labour framed by a 
common set of overall research goals under which the sub-goals of each 
                                                        
 3 See many illustrations in von Graevenitz, Mittelstraß (2011). 
 4 In other words, clusters are not »weak« but »strong ties« (Granovetter 1973). 
 5 For this distinction see Scharpf (1972). 
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project can be subsumed. This is the minimal level of social order which 
constitutes a research cluster. Many clusters may not go beyond this level 
not even after a sometimes rather long existence. However, other clusters 
reach a level of positive coordination higher than the minimal. In these 
clusters more or less and smaller or larger islands of cooperation emerge as 
a higher quality of positive coordination.  
The formal level 
On the formal level clusters can take the form of centers or institutes that 
rest on the basic funding of the university. However, as we will see in most 
cases cluster-building aims at the acquisition of external funding so these 
university-funded units are no more than a platform to pursue this goal; and 
if this is no longer successful the center or institute will be closed down. So 
the resulting entities of cluster-building are in formal terms most of the time 
mainly externally funded collections of projects shaped by the requirements 
of the funding agencies and their coordinated programs. 
To be sure, success in the acquisition of external funding will usually 
require positive coordination while conversely ongoing coordination and co-
operation will clearly benefit from (or even require) some additional funding. 
The actual level of coordination, however, may be very different within si-
milar formal structures. And we assume that at a closer look some formal 
clusters only manage to bring about negative coordination and do thus not 
breed clusters on a substantial level. 
Taking a look at existing institutional forms within the German univer-
sity system we find a considerable variety of cluster-funding. To begin with 
there are the »coordinated programs« of the DFG (Wagner 2011): the »Son-
derforschungsbereiche« (collaborative research centers) which consist of 
about 12 to 24 projects in different disciplines at the same university or at 
two universities pursuing a coordinated research agenda for up to 12 years; 
the »Schwerpunktprogramme« (priority programs) which last for six years 
and consist of up to 30 projects at different places framed by a common 
theme; and the »Forschergruppen« (research groups) which last for six years 
and consist of 6 to 8 projects framed by a common theme. In addition the 
DFG supports »Graduiertenkollegs« (graduate schools). Within the frame-
work of the »excellence initiative« there are graduate schools, too; moreover, 
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»excellence clusters« are supported which are similar to collaborative re-
search centers but can be larger and include a greater variety of infrastruc-
tural measures. Each phase of the »excellence initiative« lasts for five years; 
the second phase expires at the end of 2017 but it is likely that this very 
ambitious promotion of cluster-building will be continued in one way or 
another. Other important funding programs for clusters are provided by the 
BMBF, by some ministries at the state level for which the LOEWE program 
of Hessen is a remarkable example (Wissenschaftsrat 2013), by the Volks-
wagenStiftung, and last but not least by several programs of the EU – not 
only the series of framework programs but also the »corporate-action flag-
ships« two or three of which are in preparation and which are truly »mega 
clusters« (Hertel 2012: 14) because each of them will consist of more than 
200 projects located all over Europe and collaborating with each other in 
research about innovative challenges like »graphene«. Some research fields 
have a long tradition of such »mega clusters« – such as particle physics where 
huge experimental designs at international centers as CERN can only be re-
alised through the cooperation of thousands of researchers from all over the 
world (Knorr 1999). 
This list is supposed to just give a broad impression and is not complete. 
Similar kinds of clusters can be found in other countries although it seems 
that the variety of clusters is especially large in Germany. Some important fea-
tures of clusters beyond the already mentioned defining characteristics are: 
Aims: Especially two general research purposes are pursued by cluster-buil-
ding. One is the collective coordination of research work, the other is 
the collective organization of doctoral training. 
Cognitive scope: There are clusters which are located just within one discipline 
or even sub-discipline such as atomic physics; but more common are 
interdisciplinary clusters which sometimes integrate even disciplines 
from different fields of science such as the natural sciences and the hu-
manities. 
Organizational base: Clusters may exist within one university but can also con-
sist of an inter-organizational network. 
Kinds of organizations: Besides universities other state-funded research institutes 
such as – in Germany – Max Planck institutes or Helmholtz centers as well 
as industrial firms can be part of the organizational base of a cluster. 
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Financing: As a rule, clusters are financed not only by the basic funds of a 
university but to a large extent by extra money coming for a specified 
time period from a funding agency or the state. This means that if no 
fresh money can be acquired the cluster ends. 
Work mode: Not just as a consequence of the time limitation of funding re-
search work in a cluster is project-based.6 A cluster consists of a multi-
tude of projects in each of which research proceeds in pre-conceived 
steps according to a time-frame of milestones towards a pre-conceived 
final product – the answer to a cognitive problem which was formulated 
at the beginning. 
Reputation: Some of the types of formal clusters are extremely prestigious. 
The »Sonderforschungsbereiche« funded by the DFG and the recent »ex-
cellence clusters« funded by the »excellence initiative« are the most pro-
minent cases. 
Equipped with these descriptive and analytical clarifications we now can turn 
to the question why there has been such a rush of cluster-building in recent 
years. As we will show this tendency cannot be seen in isolation from two 
other dynamics of the university system. 
Why? Perspectives on Cluster-building 
When we compare the perspectives of the university leadership and the in-
dividual researchers on research clusters we find considerable differences 
which often amount to disagreements. Quite generally empirical evidence 
suggests that attitudes towards recent higher education reforms differ con-
siderably between university leadership and individual researchers (Bogumil 
et al. 2013). When it comes to cluster-building university leaderships are qui-
te unequivocally in favour of cluster-building while the researchers are much 
more ambivalent. 
Starting with the researcher’s perspective we find a public discourse that 
is dominated by rather general and categorical statements on the pros and 
cons of research clusters. As a German professor of engineering stated with 
utter conviction: »In the global context the engineering sciences have a large 
responsibility for answering decisive questions of life: energy, food, health, 
                                                        
 6 See Torka (2009) for a general exposition of this work mode of research. 
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environment, information, housing, traffic. […] Insofar it is absolutely clear: 
The Herculean tasks of the engineering sciences demand powerful research 
associations.« (Schmitz 2012: 16; our translation).  
However, we can also find statements that point in the opposite direc-
tion. They sometimes use a very drastic language like the German professor 
of Indology Walter Slaje who quotes polemically from a German dictionary 
that »cluster« means »pathological cell tumour« and denounces cluster-buil-
ding as »enforced networking« and a »renaissance of the communist collec-
tives of scientists« (2008: 149, 152; our translation). Although this may be an 
extreme position it expresses a widespread anxiety among researchers from 
the humanities and parts of the social sciences. In this view cluster-building 
has become a fatal obsession of policy-makers and university leaders who 
enforce this fixed idea in a »one size fits all« approach. There is some evi-
dence that even part of the elites of the humanities and social sciences share 
a positive view on clusters and – from the perspective of the cluster oppo-
nents – are disloyal to their own discipline’s research culture.7 A very tradi-
tional individualistic understanding of scientific autonomy is upheld against 
this perceived tendency by the discipline’s rank-and-file members. 
To some extent these two voices certainly reflect differences between 
scientific fields. Indeed there obviously are disciplines with a considerable 
tradition of more hierarchically integrated research such as medicine, the en-
gineering, and some of the natural sciences while others, especially the hu-
manities, are traditionally based on a highly individualized research organi-
zation and share a corresponding self-conception. Clearly the latter discipli-
nes have a more reserved attitude towards cluster-building. 
General attitudes towards research clusters as they are reflected in these 
statements may of course influence individual researchers’ decisions to par-
ticipate in concrete research arrangements or not. Still, the decisions of most 
researchers on concrete cluster-building activities are contingent upon how 
they expect to be affected by them. These »floating voters« can have various 
kinds of reasons for or against clusters. In many sub-fields of the natural and 
the social sciences both individual work and engagement in clusters can be 
equally attractive with regard to curiosity as well as to reputation. Here, 
                                                        
 7 Schiene and Schimank (2007) show that the reports written by groups of reputed dis-
ciplinary experts about the state of their disciplines at Lower Saxonian universities for the 
evaluation agency WKN resound with recommendations of cluster-building regardless of 
the discipline.  
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where researchers have a choice financial incentives and the scientific pre-
stige of at least certain types of clusters can be quite appealing. 
Furthermore, scientists may use clusters as a means of putting forward 
their own research agendas vis-à-vis their colleagues. What actually comes 
out of such efforts, however, may deviate more or less from these resear-
chers’ initial ideas because they usually are not able to dictate their approach 
on all others. The constraints associated with the need to adjust their own 
research agenda to the cluster agenda may be even greater for those who are 
asked to participate in a cluster. In this situation one researcher observed 
»that my research program has slowly fallen apart.« (Fischer 2012: 28f; our 
translation) So there is an inevitable trade-off that researchers involved can-
not maximize their own individual performance because cluster-building re-
quires from an individual researcher that he adapts his research line to what 
fits best into the cluster; and this may not always be the subjectively most 
promising alternative with respect to his own capabilities or the research 
frontiers in his field. 
Generally, the need for coordination within clusters is at odds with the 
value of scientific autonomy which is highly institutionalized within the aca-
demic profession. Scientists tend to insist on their individual right to choose 
research topics, theories, and methods autonomously and defend their »oc-
cupational control« (Child, Fulk 1982) against external pressures. Pretensions 
for professional autonomy can be justified functionally to some extent and are 
also supported by powerful ideologies (Musselin 2007). Even when this stri-
ving for autonomy does not lead to a straightforward rejection of clusters it 
certainly increases the »costs« of cluster-building on the part of the re-
searchers.8  
This finally holds true for the high transaction costs in terms of coordi-
nation and bureaucracy as well which seem daunting to many researchers. 
Everybody is aware that cluster-building is accompanied by certain transac-
tion costs of meeting, negotiating, coordinating, collective decision-making, 
etc. But in most cases it turns out that the rise of these transaction costs was 
very much underestimated. This is especially relevant because these costs have 
to be paid to a high degree by high performers. For most leaders of clusters – 
                                                        
 8 Again individual scientific autonomy is valued differently across disciplinary fields. A 
professor of philosophy with considerable experience as a science manager points into 
this direction: »The subject of research today is no longer the researcher but the research 
institution. Behind this development there is an industrial view of science. Only the 
humanities have preserved a memory of the individual subject doing research being the 
subject of research.« (Mittelstraß 2012: 60; our translation). 
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often top researchers in the cluster’s field – doing their own research becomes 
a marginal part of their work (Gerhards 2010: 125f.). They virtually turn into 
administrators, networkers, and politicians. 
With regard to the attitudes of university leadership the picture is much 
less ambiguous. University leaderships are decidedly in favour of cluster-
building; and this is a consequence of two other transformations which have 
provided these actors with a new self-understanding of their role. The first 
is the transformation of universities into actors. This is a shift of the domi-
nant institutional model of the organization in the higher education system. 
With the term model we refer to a set of cognitive and normative expecta-
tions that define what an organization is, what it could be, what it should be, 
and what reasonably can be expected from it (Meier 2012a). These models 
are not necessarily accurate descriptions of actual structures, they are often 
rather fictional in character. But they provide reforming efforts with orienta-
tion and legitimacy. And they certainly legitimize certain structural constella-
tions and elements. The dominant organizational model in German higher 
education is nowadays that of an actor. Universities are increasingly treated 
as autonomous and unified entities that control their internal processes, act in 
pursuit of self-formulated though highly scripted goals, and can legitimately 
be held accountable for what they do (Meier 2009; Krücken, Meier 2006).  
As organizations German universities traditionally had only a very limi-
ted leeway between a strong academic profession and highly regulative mi-
nistries of science. Today, universities are increasingly entitled, enabled, and 
expected to actively engage in what they can legitimately consider to be their 
own affairs. Though this transformation is basically cultural this does not 
imply the absence of coercion. The ministries of science in particular do not 
only use their regulative power to make new university laws but also their po-
wer as financiers of the universities to press for this new view of universities.  
This whole development brings about the elaboration of more complex 
formal structures, the concentration of strategic resources (Whitley 2008), 
and the establishment of a broad range of explicit organizational policies. As 
part of this development the role of the university leadership that acts on 
behalf of the organization has changed considerably. While German univer-
sity presidents traditionally used to occupy a weak and rather ceremonial 
position they now are formally empowered and gain new competences. Cor-
respondingly the rights of academic self-governance that traditionally pre-
sented the views of the academic profession and especially the professors as 
the »academic oligarchy« (Clark 1983) have been cut back. What is central 
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for our argument: We notice the expectation that leadership should actively 
engage in the development of research profiles, which is basically a new 
thing for German universities. 
Profile-building is now a key word in the German higher education dis-
course (Meier, Schimank 2002; 2010; Meier 2012b; Rogge et al. 2013). This 
idea has basically two implications. First, it is seen as the organization’s re-
sponsibility to engage in and to show commitment to the advancement of 
research. University leaderships in Germany are broadly accepting this mis-
sion and are taking the role of profile-builders. Secondly, profile-building 
implies a specification of how high quality research looks like. In this view 
the research quality of an organization is not only the aggregate of the qua-
lities of the individual researchers but an emergent property of integrated 
activities. The whole is more than its parts (Schiene, Schimank 2007). At this 
point clusters become central. As coordinated larger scale research units they 
are perceived as markers and accepted proofs of a research profile and of 
high quality research. This of course holds particularly true for prestigious 
third-party-funded clusters like excellence clusters. 
So the attitude of university leadership to cluster-building is shaped by 
new conceptions of research quality and of organizational performance of 
universities. However, cluster-building also serves some additional and so-
mewhat more »material« interests of university leaderships: Considering the 
funding environment we see that there is much to win in terms of financial 
resources but also in terms of visibility and prestige. The financial resources 
are highly connected to the specific institutional form of third-party funding 
in coordinated programs and so the interest in clusters is above all an interest 
in this kind of funding. Even though not any kind of cluster-building is 
directly heading at coordinated programs in many cases the assumption that 
it will eventually lay the foundation for a future participation in such pro-
grams will play an important role. In the view of the university leadership 
third party funding is on the one hand a relevant means that allows for high 
quality research and in some cases just extra-money desperately needed to 
compensate for stagnating or even declining basic funding.9 On the other 
hand it has become an end in itself. Successful acquisition of funding became 
                                                        
 9 This has the implication that some kinds of clusters are uninteresting to university leader-
ship because they are dispersed over many organizations so that only little money comes 
to their own university. This is the case for the DFG’s »priority programs« or international 
research networks financed within the EU framework programs where usually there is not 
more than one project per university. 
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a broadly accepted indicator of research strength (see for example the Fun-
ding Atlas of the DFG formerly referred to as funding-ranking). Clusters also 
add to the visibility of a university’s research which is essential in order to 
impress relevant audiences like science ministries, evaluators, funding agen-
cies, etc.; it is a »status symbol« (Fischer 2012: 28; our translation).10 
An additional motive may be considered with respect to organizational 
leadership as well: A small number of large-scale research units fit into the 
leadership’s span of control whereas a »flea circus« of literally hundreds of 
individual research agendas confronts leaders with an unmanageable com-
plexity. Thus, although we will see that clusters do generate specific pro-
blems to university management for good reasons university leadership is 
indeed quite unequivocally committed to clusters. 
So the overall picture of the motivation underlying the cluster-building dy-
namics at German universities shows that these dynamics are strongly cham-
pioned by university leaders whereas among researchers attitudes are more 
diverse and ambivalent. Now we have to ask: What kinds of activities do these 
attitudes initiate, and what effects does the interplay of these activities of the 
various actors involved have? So we have to analyze the constellations of 
cluster-building which can be divided in two phases: first the creation of a new 
cluster and secondly the handling of an existing cluster.  
How? Part 1: Creation of a Cluster  
Our basic hypothesis with regard to the creation of a cluster is that university 
leadership displays only limited capabilities of top-down steering but may 
play a significant role in the advancement of bottom-up-initiatives. 
There are several reasons why top-down steering within universities is 
difficult to do. In legal terms an individual professor’s right to decide auto-
nomously what and how to teach and research cannot be disregarded; in 
Germany it is even constitutionally granted. Moreover, professors usually 
cannot be dismissed, and German universities can hardly offer any additio-
nal intra-organizational career-opportunities to tenured professors (Hüther, 
                                                        
 10 For researchers, too, of course. Still these attractors are somewhat more ambivalent for 
the researchers than for the leadership because it is the individual reputation that ranks 
highest in a researcher’s preference order. 
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Krücken 2012).11 Thus, university leadership lacks important threats and in-
centives to motivate professors to engage in cluster-building. Additionally, 
steering research activities in general and cluster-building in particular is also 
very difficult to accomplish technically. It is not only the general problem of 
organizing professionals (Mintzberg 1983) but also specific characteristics 
of research work that contribute to this situation: the well-known difficulties 
of prescribing appropriate means for solving unknown problems (Gläser 
2006; Musselin 2007). 
As university leadership is usually lacking expert knowledge of its own 
on the research field in question it depends on hearing about good ideas 
from others. These may be researchers at the leadership’s own university. 
Thus, one source of ideas for cluster-building is internal. A German univer-
sity president emphasizes that »he has to pick up what the place offers, and 
just has to focus that.« (quoted by Kleimann 2013: 238; our translation). An-
other important resource of top-down initiatives is external advice by aca-
demic elites, e.g. by evaluation commissions. These may provide leaders with 
orientation and legitimacy in their reform efforts and exercise normative 
pressure on the researchers of the university to follow their advice (Meier, 
Schimank 2010).12 Still an »idea« may be a good start but it is in itself not 
enough. To keep coordination and cooperation going it has to work out in 
the dynamics of the actual scientific activity. And anyway as actual cooperation 
cannot be enforced internal and external pressures may often lead to nothing 
more than ceremonial compliance on the level of formal structures that do 
not require any change of actual practices (Meyer, Rowan 1977). It was stated 
for the humanities for instance that »cooperative research consists of tied-
together single texts« (Hirschi 2009) which suggests that a number of indi-
vidual research activities can be ceremonially dressed as a cluster without any 
substantial coordination or cooperation. Such an outcome may be accepted 
                                                        
 11 The recent salary reform for professors introduced a performance-based salary compo-
nent which is decided upon by university leadership for each individual case. In principle 
this could be used as an incentive for cluster-building; however, the possible salary in-
crease is too small to be an effective inducement. 
 12 See also Kaufmann (2011: 163–171) for comparable ambitions of university leadership 
with regard to teaching, Laudel, Weyer (2013) for Dutch universities, and Musselin on 
»the use of external peer review as a management tool by academic leaders« (2013: 9) in 
French universities. 
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by university leadership as long as the fake cluster looks sincere to the lea-
dership and other relevant audiences.13 We have to bear in mind that re-
search practices are difficult to observe, especially for non-experts. The ac-
quisition of external funding involves, however, usually peer-review and it 
will thus be difficult to successfully apply for cluster-funding without dis-
playing at least some level of positive coordination. Thus, when cluster-buil-
ding requires external funding purely ceremonial activities are likely to be 
unmasked. 
There is probably only one constellation where top-down cluster-buil-
ding by university leadership assisted by external experts may be successful: 
When enough positions are open for which professors can be recruited who 
match the thematic orientation of the cluster.14 This is a rare situation which 
may occur for example by coincidence when several professors retire at 
about the same time, or when the university gets these professorships dedi-
cated to the conceived cluster from external sources. Under these circum-
stances it is possible to install a critical mass of new researchers who are 
likely to be devoted to the cluster. However, even in these cases the cluster’s 
successful actual operation in terms of coordination and cooperation de-
pends on its internal scientific dynamics and not on the power of the uni-
versity leadership. 
Most of the time top-down initiatives of cluster-building will fail – and 
as university leadership is aware of the fact that »leading the horses to 
water«15 will not work it usually tries to go a different way (Rogge et al. 2013). 
This »softer« approach to steering is nicely expressed by the reflection from 
a German university manager: »But in the end you cannot decree research 
in a top-down process. Ultimately it is the scientists who are conducting the 
research. And from the rector’s office you can only act as a catalyser and you 
can motivate.« So in this view basically a non-hierarchical mode of commu-
nication is essential for cluster-building as the same interviewee elaborated: 
»But this is in my view perhaps the most important thing: encouraging 
                                                        
 13 Moreover, leadership may hope that its patient and skilled »doubletalk« may transform 
even pure »talk« (Brunsson 1989) eventually into »action« (Schimank 2008). 
 14 See Meier, Schimank (2010) for such cases; Fischer (2012: 65) also reports about such a 
case at the University of Göttingen.  
 15 With this quotation from an Australian study Klaus Dörre and Matthias Neis (2010: 59) 
resume their German case studies about the »dilemma of the entrepreneurial university«. 
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colleagues, moderating who may sit together with whom and give some 
thought to something«.16 
This is an expression of the collegial style of leadership with which uni-
versity leaders partly still identify and partly have to pay tribute to because 
professors insist on it. A recent analysis of the leadership style of German 
university presidents under the changed rules of New Public Management 
points out that none of the interviewees ever tried to use the new formal 
powers rigorously in order to push through reforms (Bieletzki 2013). As one 
of the interviewees said: »Pushing ahead unilaterally is nonsense. Total non-
sense. I don’t believe there are presidents who push ahead unilaterally and 
are successful. [...] They always need combatants otherwise it doesn’t work.« 
(Bieletzki 2013: 8; our translation) Thus, traditional collegiality is not simply 
replaced by hierarchy; instead both modes of coordination are blended in a 
new manner.17  
Clark Kerr depicted the role of the US-American university president 
already in the 1960s with the statement that »he is mostly mediator.« Kerr 
later regretted he had used this term because he thought his readers misun-
derstood it as too weak a figure (Kerr 1977: 36 and 142). He insisted that the 
mediator is in fact powerful. And quite in this line we suggest that university 
leadership might get in an influential position in the process of cluster-
building. More specifically, as far as there are incentives for and pressures 
on individual scientists to engage in cluster-building, the university leader-
ship can often join forces with bottom-up initiatives. There are manifold 
possibilities for a blending of bottom-up and top-down activities based on 
the blending of collegiality and hierarchy. An German university president 
explains »there is no longer the one who says ›I do what the colleagues want‹, 
in principle the old model of the rectorate, nor the one who says ›I know the 
direction, and the others better come along‹ but the question is rather how 
can I reconcile top-down, bottom-up somehow. That’s more the model 
now.« (quoted in Kleimann 2013: 12; our translation)  
More specifically we can distinguish four ways how university leadership 
can combine its efforts with bottom-up initiatives of cluster-building: 
                                                        
 16 This voice from the field was collected in the research project »Management and Self-
government of Universities: Comparison of Decision-making Processes and Consequen-
ces for Research« funded by the DFG from 2003 to 2009. 
 17 See Kleimann (2013: 380–398) for further examples of such practices. 
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– It can trigger bottom-up initiatives that did not exist before by incentives. 
The result may be that one or more bottom-up initiatives come into 
existence. 
– When at least one bottom-up initiative exists it can be picked up as a 
starting point for further activities. Picking up from several initiatives 
implies selecting some and neglecting others. 
– University leadership can give various kinds of support to bottom-up 
initiatives it picked up.  
– By giving support to a bottom-up initiative it can be influenced by uni-
versity leadership. This may lead to a smaller or larger re-direction of the 
initiative in various respects.  
To begin with, university leadership can stimulate the emergence of bottom-
up initiatives. In order to achieve this no specific knowledge of promising 
starting points for such initiatives is necessary. A university president re-
marks that it is a very good strategy to give particular professors an under-
standing of the idea of profile building in a way »that they have the feeling 
[…] it is their own idea.« (quoted in Kleimann 2013: 419; our translation). 
In addition a completely »blind« leadership may also set incentives for 
bottom-up initiatives and wait what happens. Another university president 
said: »I can only try just as a conductor to orchestrate that a little bit.« (quoted 
by Kleimann 2013: 282; our translation) Still, when initiatives pop up uni-
versity leadership has to find out whether they are sincere or ceremonial with 
the latter mainly interested in the financial support promised. Here again ex-
ternal experts may be crucial help for university leadership. 
A very delicate situation arises in case more promising bottom-up initia-
tives of cluster-building exist than the university is able to support. Then 
university leadership has to decide which initiatives get priority and which 
have to be postponed or even cancelled. This is a hard decision as a univer-
sity president states: »Now a point of intervention is naturally if we take such 
a completion as the excellence initiative where colleagues said ›we would like 
to make an application for an excellence cluster‹, then we said ›no, you’re not 
doing that because your chances are low and we can’t submit ten applica-
tions.‹« (quoted by Kleimann 2013: 361; our translation). In some cases lea-
dership may see itself as »tertius gaudens« (Simmel 1968: 89ff.) in such a 
situation; more often it is under heavy pressure from the different initiatives 
and in the worst case can lose its authority on all sides. However, the power 
to impede a cluster initiative is certainly one of the most important weapons 
154 F O R S C H E N ,  L E H R E N ,  L E R N E N  
in the hand of the university leadership by which it can exert influence on 
cluster-building activities. 
Researchers who are intending to build a cluster – either stimulated by uni-
versity leadership or on their own initiative – are most probably looking for 
support by the university leadership. As a minimum requirement their ini-
tiative needs the formal consent of the university president to apply for third 
party funds; but often a more substantial support is necessary. Besides addi-
tional resources during the phase of conceiving and writing the often extensive 
application what is more important is the leadership’s explicitly articulated de-
cision to reserve certain internal resources of the university – especially staff 
appropriations – if the application for the cluster will be successful.18 Only 
rarely these are additional resources provided for by the science ministry, for 
instance. Usually funds have to be collected through redistribution that is by 
taking them away from other parts of the university. This is naturally a source 
of conflict and university leaders must show their commitment – material as 
well as symbolic support – to a cluster initiative. 
Because a bottom-up initiative needs this commitment of university lea-
dership the latter can negotiate with the initiative about many specific featu-
res of the application. For instance leadership can suggest or even demand 
thematic shifts or the inclusion of other disciplines and their researchers into 
the cluster; it can insist on cooperation with other institutions, on stronger 
internationalization, or on add-ons such as special provisions for female doc-
toral students or the public dissemination of research results. In this way lea-
dership can substantially contribute to the final shape of the cluster. Usually 
and for good reasons it will not interfere into the cluster’s cognitive core; but 
its periphery may be an important ingredient of a cluster’s profile, too. 
So far we have discussed the relationship between university leadership 
and researchers who engage in cluster-building. However, this relationship is 
embedded in a larger constellation which also includes university groups that 
for one reason or another threaten to disturb or even block a cluster building 
process. Interfering factors may be competing cluster-building activities, 
groups that want to become part of a specific cluster, or groups that try to 
prevent a specific cluster-building. Perhaps »troublemakers« want to prevent 
any kind of cluster building because they fear that a new cluster will lead to an 
intra-university redistribution of resources and will outshine them.19 The 
                                                        
 18 Kaufmann (2011: 115) refers to this new source of influence of university leadership. 
 19 As Laudel and Weyer point out for Dutch universities this fear is not without reason: 
»researchers in fields that are given a lower priority may feel unwelcome and threatened 
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university leadership’s formal power will hardly suffice to stop troublemaking 
altogether. Even though ultimately troublemaking may not prevent cluster 
building it can very well lead to endless delays. In this situation it is usually the 
most efficient way to fight against such practices with bribery.  
Accordingly university leadership has to reserve some resources for side 
payments by which troublemakers can be induced to drop their resistance. 
As a university president confesses: »You have to do something […] to 
bribe. I did it myself, gave them money so that they kept their mouths shut.« 
(quoted by Kleimann 2013: 396; our translation) Such side payments may 
consist of some participation in the cluster typically only formally connected 
to its core activities but entitled to a portion of its resources. But there can also 
be many other kinds of side payments to a department not involved in the 
cluster or to older professors whose research drive has slowed down but who 
still occupy powerful positions in the university’s academic self-governance.  
Of course university leaderships will try to keep side payments at a mini-
mum. However, when it is common knowledge within a university that its 
rector or president tends to deal with disturbances of his plans by side pay-
ments even actors who in fact are indifferent to a cluster building initiative 
may pretend that they feel affected and are inclined to mobilize resistance in 
order to make a profit from their acquiescence. Thus, on the one hand uni-
versity leadership has to avoid the impression that it relies only and imme-
diately on side payments because this would inflate the price which has to 
be paid for an undisturbed process. On the other hand side payments may 
be necessary to maintain a cluster building initiative’s momentum against 
delays which otherwise may bring about that it dies away. 
When a bottom-up initiative for a research cluster has been incited and 
nurtured by university leadership and when the resistance of others has been 
overcome the cluster has come into existence. What happens now? The pro-
blems which have to be dealt with are not overcome – on the contrary they 
may become even more difficult. 
                                                        
[…] they know that their position becomes precarious whenever budget problems occur.« 
(2013: 18) 
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How? Part 2: Handling a Cluster 
Having successfully created a cluster, for instance a »Sonderforschungsbe-
reich« of the DFG or an »excellence cluster« is certainly an achievement of 
university leadership. The university gains visibility, the »Matthew principle« 
(Merton 1985) shows its effects. Nevertheless handling an existing cluster 
brings about new problems four of which we want to highlight in the 
following: (a) managing a matrix structure, (b) negotiating inter-organiza-
tional relationships, (c) avoiding to lose control, and (d) shutting down a 
cluster. These are not the usual problems which the management of a re-
search organization or more specifically a university has to deal with again 
and again20 but which arise when a research cluster becomes part of the exi-
sting organizational structure. 
a) Managing a Matrix Structure 
As soon as a cluster is established and works on a regular basis conflicts may 
arise from the fact that it is cross-linked with several or even all departments 
of the university (Rogge et al. 2013). These conflicts originate not only in the 
general violation of a department’s vested interests by this new organiza-
tional unit. There are also a number of specific reasons for disagreement. If 
for example a professorship has to be filled which formally belongs to a 
certain department and to the cluster at the same time the department usually 
tries to take care that its teaching requirements are not neglected whereas 
the cluster often has an interest to recruit someone with a highly specialized 
research profile. Both demands are legitimate but frequently cannot be re-
conciled. For university leadership this poses the problem of managing a 
matrix structure.21 
Conflicts like this may accumulate over time and lead to a strong polari-
zation between cluster and departments. In extreme cases the cluster may 
become the university’s scapegoat which is made responsible for all kinds of 
                                                        
 20 See Mayntz (1985) for a collection of typical and unavoidable management problems the 
leaders of extra-university state-funded research organizations face. 
 21 This problem was prominent, for example, in the successful application proposal of the 
University of Bremen for the third funding line of the »excellence initiative« in 2012 where 
»institutional strategies« to maintain and enhance research excellence were supported. In 
the expert hearings the question how such a matrix structure can be governed came up 
again and again.  
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conflicts.22 However, the fact that there is not just one issue of conflict but 
many such issues come up over time gives university leadership a chance to 
divide burdens more evenly among the parties. Today the cluster’s interests 
may be pursued to the disadvantage of some departments but tomorrow it 
can be the other way round. Such a strategy of »turn-taking« has a chance of 
being perceived as a fair compromise so that it can pacify the conflictual 
atmosphere. However, there may be longer periods when the interests of 
one side should be given a consistent priority, and this may use up the pa-
tience of the others who have to make one concession after the other. The 
early phase of a cluster when it needs continually growing resources – which 
often have to be taken from the departments – is especially delicate in this 
respect. In an extreme case the cluster dynamic is stifled to a standstill with 
the final result of a permanently unfinished unit which eats up resources but 
does not contribute significantly to the university’s visibility. 
b) Negotiating Inter-organizational Relationships 
A second problem which also results from tensions the cluster introduces into 
existing organizational arrangements is localized in inter-organizational rela-
tionships. This applies to those kinds of clusters which span the boundaries of 
one university and are partly located in one or more other organizations – 
other universities or extra-university research institutes in the same region. 
Examples are »cooperative research centers« where some of the projects are 
affiliated to a university while others are situated within a Max Planck institute 
or even more ambitious designs such as the »Karlsruhe Institute of Techno-
logy« (KIT) supported by the »excellence initiative« which is nothing less than 
a partial organizational fusion of the University of Karlsruhe and the For-
schungszentrum Karlsruhe, one of the Helmholtz Centers.  
Such inter-organizationally based clusters raise additional management 
problems. On the one hand, they are very attractive because their visibility 
is likely to be higher than that of intra-university clusters, and such concerted 
efforts of several organizations to coordinate their research agendas within 
                                                        
 22 Even if a cluster belonged to just one department – which is not often the case – this type 
of conflict can arise because, for example, the above-mentioned tension between teaching 
requirements and research needs is not so much a conflict between disciplines but be-
tween organizational missions. Still, the matrix becomes more and more complicated with 
a multiplication of potential conflicts and veto points the more departments share a 
cluster. 
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the framework of a joint profile are the darlings of present day research po-
licy. On the other hand, the drawbacks of such arrangements show up when 
they are implemented; and those who get acquainted with these problems 
first are not the organizational leaders who conceived the general scheme of 
the cluster but the researchers in their daily practices of coordination and 
cooperation. Different organizational rules and regulations sometimes col-
lide over small issues such as the way how business travels are reimbursed 
but at other times also over more serious concerns, for instance the proce-
dures of recruiting new professors, especially over who has the final decision 
and negotiates with selected candidates. In addition just as different depart-
ments that participate in an intra-organizationally based cluster have diffe-
rent interests so do the different organizations to which the inter-organiza-
tionally based cluster belongs. But in the first case there is a unified authority 
for conflict resolution at the top with university leadership whereas conflicts 
about inter-organizationally based clusters have to be negotiated between the 
leaderships of the different organizations.  
Sometimes the cluster may get into the advantageous situation of profiting 
from the conflicts between the organizations in which it is located. This may 
happen when the organizations’ disagreement leads to a mutually neutralizing of 
influence on the cluster so that its leaders and each of its researchers may gain 
additional autonomy. However, it seems to be more often the case that a cluster 
can become effectively blocked in its work by such unsolved disputes. This 
occurs especially when financial resources are at stake. 
c) Avoiding to lose Control 
We come to another typical problem of handling a cluster: When it has wor-
ked successfully for a while, accompanied by growth which is financed by 
more basic funding from the university or by acquired third party funding, 
sooner or later and almost inevitably the university leadership will run into 
the danger of losing control over the cluster. This is the risk involved when 
a university leadership tries to support a cluster to become successful. When 
it finally has achieved success and is nationally or even internationally recog-
nized for its »excellence« a turning-point is reached. There is a chance that 
this may turn out as a durable »win-win« constellation in which both univer-
sity leadership and the cluster may benefit – as expected – from their joint 
effort. The university has got its flagship and the researchers involved have 
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got their highly improved research opportunities. However, cluster-building 
establishes a new and growing location of power within the university. Re-
search groups, excellence clusters, interdisciplinary centres, graduate schools, 
etc. are not only highly independent of their university leadership – even 
more the latter becomes dependent upon these units’ success in the acqui-
sition of third-party funds. Instead of a unified university headed by a strong 
leadership a loose assembly of such largely independent power centers may 
result from cluster-building. An observer notes a »strange double authority 
structure« within a department: »There are deans who have something to say 
because they were elected and are responsible for many things but there are 
also cluster coordinators […] who have something to say because they are 
winners and darlings of the university leadership.« (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, August 14, 2008) So the interests of the cluster more and more 
dominate the strategy of the university. In particular university leadership 
may be forced to allocate an increasing share of financial resources to the 
cluster because in the extreme case the university’s reputation has become 
completely dependent upon the cluster’s continuing success. But even if the 
cluster is able to acquire most of its resources without having to turn to 
university leadership the latter becomes dependent upon the cluster’s on-
going success in the acquisition of third-party funds. 
So the »power-dependence relation« (Emerson 1962) is likely to become 
reversed. Now the cluster can demand more and more concessions from uni-
versity leadership – always legitimated by the joint interest to maintain and if 
possible enhance the cluster’s status. Furthermore, this may result in a public 
image of the cluster outshining the university to which it belongs. At this point 
the university leadership may wonder whether this is still worth its price: The 
university contributes with a considerable effort – including internal conflicts 
which have to be pacified by side payments – to the cluster’s success but the 
public attention has shifted entirely to the cluster. It is no longer the gem as-
sociated with its university but a stand-alone beauty. 
Here university leadership has to maintain a delicate balance. On the one 
hand, it has to give the cluster enough room to move for its own develop-
ment. If the cluster is too tightly coupled to the other organizational, espe-
cially the decision-making structures of the university there is a real danger 
that the established powerful actors, the departments in particular, will not 
allow the cluster’s blossoming for reasons that range from rational conside-
rations to jealousy. On the other hand, it has to be prevented that the cluster 
becomes so powerful that it is able to walk away from the university or to 
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dictate its demands on the university leadership. No matter how important 
and successful the cluster might be in realizing the interests associated with 
it from the side of university leadership it has to remain just a part of the whole.  
Those researchers at a university who do not belong to a cluster have 
good reasons to worry about the time when its funding ceases. As long as it 
has worked successfully it is obvious that its continuation has high priority 
for the university leadership. An internal redistribution of basic funds is ne-
cessary to continue the cluster to the degree that no new third party funds 
can be acquired. Such concerns of non-cluster researchers are no particular 
problem – except for acts of resistance – if these other groups are low re-
search performers; but this is not necessarily the case. If, however, strong 
individual researchers for instance in sociology are cut off from their modest 
resource base because they cannot compete with highly visible but mediocre 
clusters in nanotechnology this logic becomes obviously dysfunctional. This 
side of the picture is rarely discussed. However, a recent reflection on the 
first experiences from the »excellence initiative« notes that universities shall 
»disclose the costs of profile-building« especially with regard to »which dis-
ciplines are specifically supported to the disadvantage of which other disci-
plines« (BBAW 2010: 43; our translation).  
d) Shutting down a Cluster 
Now we come to a final problem of handling a cluster – final in the double 
sense of the word. At this point there is an almost inevitable strong conflict 
of interests between the cluster and university leadership. When the cluster 
has reached its zenith and further innovative ideas have been missed for 
quite a while university leadership must face the problem of its termination. 
Helmut Schelsky already saw as one of the tasks of »a far-sighted and skillful« 
university leadership »to terminate such centers of the university in due time 
and to establish new progressive ones in their place.« (1963: 314; our trans-
lation) But this is easier said than done. When the right moment has come 
to reallocate resources from an established cluster to a promising new bot-
tom-up initiative the former is usually still quite influential within the uni-
versity and often also outside. Its researchers may be well represented within 
the university’s formal and informal decision-making structures as well as 
within the wider scientific community and the funding agencies; they may 
be part of the established mainstream which can defend its claims very well 
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by a variety of means. In particular the cluster can hide for quite some time 
that its best times are over; and it does this very authentically because its 
members probably really believe that they still have much to offer in the future.  
Accordingly it is very difficult for university leadership to early enough 
detect that it should reallocate resources and even if this is realized and such 
attempts are made they are blamed immediately as illegitimate by the cluster 
and its supporters. To a certain extent it may help to fix the life-span of a 
cluster from the beginning and quite schematically as it is done with the 
»Sonderforschungsbereiche« of the DFG which end after twelve years at the 
latest no matter how innovative its potential might still be. Yet even with 
such deadlines many clusters are de facto established open-ended. For exam-
ple the principal investigators of a »Sonderforschungsbereich« are likely to 
plan a successive cluster in the final phase of the existing one. Their univer-
sity leadership expects this from them and they are supported to do this. As 
long as such new applications for third-party funding are successful new co-
horts of researchers are recruited, and as long as the usual performance indi-
cators do not show any alarming signs the chances are high that a cluster on 
a downward trend remains strong enough to outfight competitors within the 
university. It may be even supported by other actors within the university 
with whom it had many conflicts before but finally reached at least a tacit 
agreement of »live and let live!« They may reckon with the reliability of the 
status quo whereas the inevitable turmoil of terminating the old and building 
up a new cluster is highly uncertain. All in all it seems that rather exceptional 
opportunities are necessary for a university leadership to be able to terminate 
an established cluster at the right time. A long decline which eats up consi-
derable financial resources that are lacking for the support of innovative new 
initiatives is more common. 
These four typical problems of handling an existing cluster are a non-exhaustive 
list. For instance we have not mentioned all kinds of red tape. Still the problems 
described here show that the implementation of a cluster over time is costly for 
university leadership. Leading a university without clusters surely is an easier way 
to go. That university leaders nevertheless do almost anything to create clusters 
shows that the perceived benefits of having clusters outweigh these costs. 
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Conclusion 
It would be worthwhile to study the real – in contrast to the perceived – 
positive and negative effects of cluster-building for a particular university. 
This is the meso level of effects. In our analysis we briefly mentioned some 
micro level effects of engaging in cluster-building for individual researchers. 
But the most important level where effects of cluster-building have to be 
studied is the macro level. In other words: What does it mean for the per-
formance of the national and global science system if cluster-building occurs 
in more and more scientific fields? 
The prevalent cluster rhetoric provides us with a one-sided view which 
stresses the positive effects of cluster-building on scientific progress. It is 
even claimed that without cluster-building any further progress is hampered. 
Without denying the advantages of cluster-building in many research fields 
it has to be asked whether this is a universal recipe for further scientific pro-
gress and whether its benefits always outweigh the costs. To give an example 
of the issues that have to be reflected: The coordination of research work 
which constitutes clusters means a declining autonomy for the individual 
selection of research topics. This implies necessarily an overall declining di-
versity of topics and approaches in the cluster’s field. To the degree that 
diversity is beneficial as a variation pool of the evolutionary progress of 
knowledge (Nowotny 1990) clusters may be detrimental because they nar-
row down perspectives by coordination of individual research lines even 
more so by research cooperation.  
Let us repeat: This is not a plea against cluster-building and for individu-
alistic research. We simply do not have enough empirically based knowledge 
about the macro effects of a proliferation of research clusters in more and 
more scientific fields. Speculations like the ones just mentioned have to be 
carefully investigated to find out whether they are true or not. We assume 
that such investigations might come to the overall conclusion that certain 
kinds of clusters in certain contexts and under certain conditions are highly 
functional for scientific progress but that there are other circumstances whe-
re cluster-building is detrimental to the knowledge production of science. 
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